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Preface 
Early in 1989, a group of AERC researchers interested in studies of African 
financial markets, with a special emphasis on the informal sector, began 
several country studies that were scheduled to be completed in three phases. 
For the three phases it was agreed to: 
1. characterize the informal sector, thereby analysing the rationale for its 
existence, estimating its size, and providing a detailed description of its 
operation on the financial market; 
2. analyze the relationship between the formal and informal segments of the 
financial market, if any; and 
3. establish the efficacy of macroeconomic policies, bearing in mind the 
existence of a strong informal financial sector. 
A high degree of characterization of the informal sector was achieved in the 
first phase of the Ghana study (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)), following a 
study of 1000 market women in three Ghanaian cities. Repeated observations 
that in fact there were not two financial markets, but one highly fragmented 
one encouraged a deeper probe into the relationship between the different 
segments. This report is the outcome of the second-phase efforts in that 
direction. We use the activities of moneylenders to represent the lending side 
of the informal sector, while that of susu collectors represents the 
savings-mobilization capabilities of the sector. This does not suggest that they 
are the only forms the informal sector takes, but linkages with the formal 
sector are best portrayed through them. 
I Introduction 
A number of linkages between the formal and informal sectors of the financial 
market have been observed in Ghana (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). These 
linkages were observed both in savings mobilization and in credit allocation. 
What is not yet clear is how significant these linkages are for the development 
of the entire financial sector of the economy, and therefore the extent to which 
action taken in one financial sector may have repercussions in another. This 
may partiy depend on whether the linkage relationship is complementary or 
competitive. Knowing the effect of this relationship on the financial market 
could assist in directing government policy towards them. 
While it is sometimes believed that most of the urban demand for savings 
and credit facilities from informal financial organizations substitutes for 
demand from formal sources, elements of complementarity may also be present 
in this relationship (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). In rural areas, there is little 
demand for savings and credit facilities because of the lack of formal 
institutions and few complementary relationships can be observed. 
One fact emerging from the research to date is that while the financial 
market is extensively segmented, demand for credit or savings facilities in one 
sector cannot always be said to be exclusive to that sector. In fact, the linkages 
between the sectors arise out of this "non-specific" demand. Many people who 
would normally use the services of the formal sector, such as urban 
public-sector employees, find themselves compelled to use the services offered 
by the informal sector to complement what they have received or may receive 
form the formal sector. They also sometimes make a substitution if the price 
of credit from the informal sector is lower, as will be the case in borrowing at 
near-zero interest from friends. Similarly "normal" informal savers, such as 
rural dwellers, may begin saving on the formal circuit if an opportunity for 
obtaining cheap credit comes up by way of a government or NGO-sponsored 
rural finance project. Here the formal credit substitutes for the expensive 
informal credit. 
Aside from the direct movements of "consumers" across sectors, there are 
situations where institutional relationships arise. The first is the situation where 
susu collectors daily deposit savings with commercial banks, as observed by 
Aryeetey and Gockel (1990) and confirmed by Seibel (1989). Another less 
2 SECTORS OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET IN GHANA 
commonplace example is the situation of moneylenders borrowing money from 
banks to support their lending business. 
The above relationships notwithstanding, accurate categorization of supply 
and demand for financial services is difficult in view of the diverse nature of 
institutions and individuals involved in the sale and purchase of financial 
services, as well as the diversity in public attitudes to the different services. It 
may, therefore, be presumed that different demand and supply structures for 
each sector would ensure the continued segmentation of the market and have 
a bearing on the relationship between them; but in what way? 
One fact which is quite clear is that the "non-specific' element of the 
demand in both sectors, as well as their marginal and average costs, has a 
crucial role to play in price determination within each. What is not clear, 
however, is whether the two prices have any direct or indirect relationship with 
each other. In other words, to what extent can changes in one sector be 
expected to influence changes in the other? Also, under what conditions will 
the separation of the markets be maintained, even if only partially? The first 
phase of our work suggested that aside from the operating costs of the agents 
involved, a number of factors, both economic and non-economic, may be 
crucial. Thus, for example, such factors as high transaction costs in seeking 
formal financial services, as well as some "political" costs (e.g. government 
tampering with private savings in 1982, among others), and also direct 
institutional barriers, were identified as influencing the continued separation of 
the market (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). "Political" costs, for example, 
tended to undermine confidence in the formal system and thereby keep away 
many people who otherwise would have patronized it. Institutional barriers also 
arose from numerous bureaucratic requirements that could not be readily 
fulfilled by those who needed financial services and who could probably have 
put some credit to sound economic use (see Aryeetey and Hyuha (1990)). 
While it is certain that price determination processes would give a strong 
indication of these relationships if properly investigated, we do not go that far 
in this paper. Rather, we devote our attention to studying the different 
scenarios under which activity in one segment has been observed to lead to 
"reactions" in the other. 
Objectives, methodology and scope 
It must be emphasized that this study is part of an on-going attempt to move 
studies of informal financial markets from the purely descriptive realm to one 
of conceptualizing observed relationships based on earlier descriptions of the 
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financial system. The results should enhance the use of policy tools applicable 
to a broader spectrum of the financial system. Thus, this work seeks to: 
1. explain the significance of the issue of complementary and competitive 
relationships between formal and informal segments of the credit market, 
looking at the behaviour of lenders and borrowers under different situations, 
and the general impact of these on the provision of credit within the system; 
and 
2. establish the importance of direct links between units in the formal and 
informal segments of the financial market with regard to savings 
mobilization, the process of intermediation and of growth in the financial 
system e.g. through the use of banking facilities by susu collectors. 
To do this, the study applies both descriptive and analytical methods to 
observed trends in the relationships. In view of the abundance of primary data 
which indicate the responses and attitudes of savers, borrowers, small 
investors, etc., and the dearth of suitable macroeconomic data, the analysis is 
limited to conceptualizing expected behaviour of various actors and assessing 
the extent to which observed behaviour conforms to these. Such observed 
behaviour is then explained and policy implications highlighted. 
The work is presented in four sections. Following this introductory section, 
Section II studies linkages in the credit market, based on three scenarios of (a) 
a competitive relationship between the two segments; (b) a complementary 
relationship between them; and (c) the formal sector channelling its resources 
through the informal sector in order to reach borrowers. Section III studies the 
observed linkage in savings mobilization, highlighting the use of deposit 
facilities of banks by susu collectors in Accra. In Section IV, the policy 
implications of the above observations are discussed. 
Data utilized for the study 
In this study, data collected in 1989 on the financing of trading activities of 
1,000 market women in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi are supplemented with 
data obtained through interviews with 100 small entrepreneurs at Koforidua, 
Nsawam, Nkawkaw and Asamankese (medium-sized towns in the Eastern 
Region of Ghana) for the study of competitive and complementary relations 
in the application of credit in Section II. These data were collected in August 
1990. For our analysis in Section III, data were obtained from interviews 
conducted in January 1991 and completed questionnaires from 151 susu 
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collectors, as well as information from various commercial banks on the 
balances of susu collectors. 
Literature review 
It has been suggested that the link between the formal and informal financial 
markets might be weak, and that, with economic growth and development, the 
informal sector would tend to diminish in size and in importance (Ghatak 
(1981)). This suggestion needs to be treated with some reservation. Whereas 
the significance of the link for both sectors has not yet been firmly established, 
there is evidence that the formal sector in Ghana relies extensively on the 
informal sector for savings mobilization (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). This 
link forms the basis of the analysis in Section III. Our evidence suggests that 
the informal sector grows and adapts itself to changing situations without 
losing its major characteristic of flexibility. Thus the sector remains strong at 
all times. 
Most of the "new structuralist" discussions on the relative merits of the 
McKinnon-Shaw proposals attach much importance to what they see as a 
strong relationship between the formal and informal financial sectors (see van 
Wijnbergen (1983)(1985); Taylor (1983); Lim (1987)). New structuralists 
assume that, following financial liberalization, the use of credit for financial 
working capital would suffer from the rising cost of credit thus pushing up 
prices under monopolistic conditions. This results in a stagflationary process 
which can only be removed if there is residual financing from the informal 
sector. However, lending from the informal sector would depend, among other 
things, on the nominal deposit rate and the rate of inflation, assumed 
exogenous in the short run. Similarly growth in time and savings deposits 
would depend on these rates. 
Aryeetey et al. (1990), however, did not observe a particularly strong 
relationship between deposit rates and portfolio choice in the Ghanaian 
financial system. While real deposit rates had a positive and significant effect 
on the average propensity to save, a low coefficient deprived it of any power 
in influencing how much households would save with changes in the real rates. 
It is likely, therefore, that interest rates per se are irrelevant in influencing 
savings mobilization at present. This assertion is supported by the savings 
practices in the informal market where savers would rather pay a day's saving 
to a susu collector (in order to make use of the facility). We suggested in the 
first phase of our work that the relationship between the two markets on the 
savings side is strongest via the expectations of "non-specific" demand with 
credit availability, and on the lending side via the opportunity and other costs 
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involved in lending. In other words, people save where they think they can 
find credit and lend if they cannot invest their money elsewhere. 
Finding an appropriate theoretical framework to study the phenomena 
described above is not easy. Thus, for example, models of equilibrium asset 
pricing for segmented and integrated financial markets, such as that offered by 
Eun and Janakiraman (1986), have not been particularly helpful because the 
degree of sophistication required of the capital market, and the complexity of 
the data required, still remain beyond the scope of the Ghanaian financial 
system. Also, attempts to study the relationship as an application of a general 
equilibrium model to a distorted economy with parallel markets are 
discouraged by the fact that underlying such an approach is the assumption 
that the informal market may have resulted from a repressive policy which 
forces excess demand to spill over into the other (see Azam and Besley 
(1990)). While this may be partially true in the Ghanaian case, particularly 
with some urban demand for credit, the informal sector in Ghana has done 
relatively well in these days of formal financial "liberalization" and direct 
efforts to encourage the formal system (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). Thus, 
even though the approach holds some hope for a further study of price 
determination, its usefulness for the present objectives is limited. 
A number of attempts to study the links between formal and informal 
financial markets have been based on appraisals of efforts to institutionalize 
rural credit facilities. Underlying these studies has been the assumption that the 
high prices of rural credit were attributable to monopoly profits accruing to 
moneylenders in such areas. In order to reduce the price of credit, the power 
of the monopolist moneylender has to be reduced, thus prompting governments 
to set up institutions to compete with moneylenders. Contrary to expectation, 
however, and as observed by Hoff and Stiglitz (1990), moneylenders continue 
to exist and continue to apply interest rates which are much higher than those 
of the formal institutions, while the latter have difficulty with repayment of 
loans and often require recapitalization initiatives. The situation is similar in 
Ghana where rural banks were created on similar premises. In studying how 
these two co-exist in rural areas, the linkage is inevitably pursued on the 
lending side. 
The World Bank devoted the whole of its September 1990 issue of The 
World Bank Economic Review (WBER) to various studies of rural credit 
markets. All the articles were written in "the framework of imperfect 
information paradigm" (Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) pp. 235). It is explained that 
this new paradigm is the result of major advances in the theoretical 
understanding of the workings of credit markets. They emphasize the problems 
of imperfect information and enforcement in explaining how lenders and 
borrowers will behave in relation to the two segments of the credit market 
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under particular circumstances. The actions of lenders depend on the amount 
of information they have about their clients and the enforcement power they 
possess. It is the different degrees of information and enforcement power that 
enables formal and informal lenders to approach borrowers differently. Thus, 
the ability of the informal moneylender to a) perform a better screening of 
clients, b) possibly offer better incentives to make repayment more likely, and 
c) solve the enforcement problem by compelling repayment, ensures that 
"the moneylender's power is unlikely to be broken by the entry 
of institutional credit, unless the new institutions themselves 
find substitutes for the direct mechanisms used by 
moneylenders to overcome the problems of screening, 
incentives, and enforcement" (Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) pp. 238). 
Among the articles in this edition of the WBER, one of the most relevant 
to our study is that by Bell (1990) which puts together the effects on prices 
and term structures of loans resulting from linkages between formal and 
informal lenders. In this study (based on rural India), Bell assumes that 
informal lenders compete with state agencies (such as co-operatives and 
banks), once these have been created, to reduce the influence of 
money-lenders. He then goes on to establish four different scenarios for rural 
lending involving moneylenders and/or institutional lenders and determines 
how they affect the welfare of the borrower. The first is one of moneylenders 
operating in the absence of state agencies; the second is exclusive institutional 
loans or institutional lenders operating in the absence of moneylenders. With 
these two scenarios, he attempts to establish equilibrium in the credit market 
with exclusive contracts, relying on such concepts as the iso-expected profits 
of the moneylender, the iso-expected net income of the borrower, the notional 
individual credit demand and notional supply, and the borrowers' opportunity 
set when dealing with rationing banks. He considers the situation of the 
moneylender being either monopolistic or operating in a market with free 
entry. By and large, the outcome of these two scenarios depends on whether 
institutional credit is rationed at the regulated rate of interest. 
In the third scenario of non-exclusive institutional contracts, borrowing from 
the informal sector is usually considered to occur after the borrower has failed 
to find formal credit. This is supported by empirical evidence and is not any 
different from some observations in Ghana. In this situation, a spillover from 
the formal to the informal segment of the market will occur so long as there 
is formal rationing at a fixed interest rate and lenders find it profitable to lend 
after screening the borrower. 
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In the fourth scenario, moneylenders act as intermediaries for institutional 
lenders. In this situation, the cost of funds for the moneylender will fall. The 
impact on his clients will depend on whether he is a perfect competitor or a 
monopolist. In the case of perfect competitors, the entire gain from the fall 
goes to borrowers, while it is shared between lender and borrower under 
monopolies. 
On the basis of his analysis and conclusions (which suggest that the 
presence of the informal moneylender in the credit market does not necessarily 
have a negative impact on the borrower), Bell made a number of policy 
proposals including (a) the need to use the knowledge of informal lenders in 
the formal sector, (b) the need to interlink institutional credit with the 
marketing of goods and the supply of inputs, (c) the need to remove 
restrictions on the trader-moneylender, and finally (d) the need to use direct 
measures to raise incomes in undeveloped areas. 
The relevance of Bell's work to our own study is the framework it provides 
for analysis in the third and fourth scenarios, and we make use of this in the 
next section. These relationships were observed in the first phase of our work 
and are studied here with our own data. In spite of the valuable insights 
offered by Bell and others, it would appear that the ability of the moneylender 
to meet the credit needs of borrowers is exaggerated. This would certainly be 
so in the Ghanaian context, as we showed earlier (Aryeetey and Gockel 
(1990)). 
II Linkages between formal and informal 
segments of the Ghanaian credit market 
Three possible linkages with the credit market are possible. The first is one 
where the application of formal credit competes with the application of 
informal credit in the finance of businesses. The second is where the two are 
applied in a complementary manner by businesses. The third is where informal 
credit suppliers act as conduits or intermediaries between formal lenders and 
borrowers. 
This section considers these three possible linkages in the credit market in 
terms of their prevalence and also the impact on borrowers. In this situation, 
equilibrium will be measured by what decisions potential borrowers make, 
given the information and opportunities available to them. Before doing that, 
however, we digress to describe some characteristics of potential users of 
credit used for the analysis in this section. 
Some characteristics of small entrepreneurial credit users 
The 100 entrepreneurs interviewed (of whom 12 were female) were between 
the ages of 24 and 64, with a mean of 40. They were engaged in such diverse 
activities as commercial poultry rearing, concrete-block manufacture, transport, 
trading in household goods, trading in construction materials, trading in 
chemicals and other pharmaceutical products, equipment repair (including 
auto-works, welding, bicycle repair, etc.), building and road construction, and 
food processing. Most of them were involved in more than one activity, the 
significance of which will be made clear in our description of financing 
techniques. While seven enterprises operated as partnerships, eight were family 
businesses, and the remainder operated as sole proprietorships. At the time of 
the survey (August 1990), the enterprises had been operating for between I 
and 42 years, with a mean of 12 years. 
While in a few cases entrepreneurs had gone into the activity by inheriting 
the establishment, the profit motive appears to have been the over-riding factor 
for engaging in a particular business. Most of the entrepreneurs (60 per cent) 
started their businesses with capital provided from their own savings. Credit 
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(mainly from friends/relatives) was used to start the business in only 12 per 
cent of the enterprises studied. 
Being mainly micro-enterprises, employment was limited. About 60 per cent 
of the businesses had no paid employees at the beginning of their operations, 
and this situation had not changed for 55 per cent at the time of the study. 
Many of those who began with paid employees now have none because of 
declining activity. As many as 50 per cent of the entrepreneurs indicated that 
output between the year of establishment and the time of survey had not 
grown. This is similar to the observations of Steel and Webster (1990) where 
most of the micro-enterprises studied suffered decreases in output after 1983. 
Thus, at present the average number of employees per firm is one. This low 
level of employment was in spite of the fact that periodic investments in the 
plant or establishment were carried out. Indeed, about 60 per cent of the 
businesses undertook significant investment purchases in 1989, and more than 
75 per cent recorded profits (ranging from 50 to 1,000 per cent) over total 
variable costs in 1989-90. The picture generally portrayed is one of much 
confidence in the economic viability of the enterprises if assured of adequate 
investment capital. The entrepreneurs saw their enterprises as ones that could 
be supported without much risk. This optimism about the future of small 
enterprises if assured of adequate support is also shared by Steel and Webster 
(1990). 
Relationships between micro-enterprises and banking 
institutions 
All the 100 entrepreneurs operated bank accounts on behalf of their enterprises. 
In 52 per cent of these cases, demand deposits alone were run, while another 
21 per cent operated only savings deposits. The remainder operated both types 
of accounts (only one enterprise operated a fixed deposit). 
Most of the accounts had been operated for long periods (usually starting 
from the year in which the enterprises were begun and averaging 7.5 years), 
thus giving banks ample opportunity to assess the financial worth of the 
enterprises, if not the returns on their projects. 
With one exception, all the enterprises had applied for bank credit at one 
time or another since 1985. The average number of applications was two per 
enterprise. In almost 50 per cent of these cases, long-term credit (more than 
one year maturity date) was being sought, while the other half sought mainly 
overdraft facilities. In 49 cases, credit was sought to expand plant size, while 
36 wanted credit to purchase raw materials. Only 2 per cent had wanted bank 
credit to start their businesses. 
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Another striking feature of the relationship between these small enterprises 
and formal banking institutions was that only one out of the 100 received the 
full loan applied for. In 26 cases, only a part of the original amount applied 
for was granted, while the remaining applications were rejected. 
Use of in formal financial services by small entrepreneurs 
While it was established in the first phase of the research that market women 
in both rural and urban parts of Ghana used informal facilities for saving (77 
per cent), only 20 per cent of these other micro-entrepreneurs did the same. 
For those who did, saving was done with the new large susu companies which 
operate on the same lines as the savings and loan associations of America and 
elsewhere. It must be pointed out, however, that 80 per cent of those not 
presently saving with the susu system had done so earlier. Interestingly, many 
of these micro-entrepreneurs in the Eastern Region who saved with an informal 
organization, or had done so earlier, admitted that their expectation of being 
granted credit facilities after a short period of saving motivated their decision 
to allocate a part of their portfolio to this facility. However, there is a high 
level of dissatisfaction with the type and quality of services so far offered by 
these recently modified versions of the susu system. Most entrepreneurs 
indicated that repayment defaults were a major problem for them. The susu 
companies have this difficulty in view of the fact that they fail to keep 
adequate cash reserves and have been imprudent in the granting of loans. The 
low cash reserves and the difficulty in returning accumulated savings to clients 
is explained by a high rate of default in repayment of loans granted to some 
clients. Even though the amounts granted per client were not very large (the 
equivalent of six months' deposits after saving regularly for six months at a 
rate of 50 per cent for six months), the granting of this facility to many 
customers at once and the high rate of default have helped to erode whatever 
reserves these companies might have attempted to keep. The companies had 
hoped to finance further loans from the initial rapid growth in clientele. 
Following these shortcomings, the large susu companies have been forced to 
cut back extensively on the granting of credit facilities, which has subsequently 
reduced their attractiveness. 
Competitive relationships in the credit market 
The main question in Bell's (1990) discussion was whether formal financial 
institutions providing cheap credit to borrowers push moneylenders out of 
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business. Using official data on indebtedness, he contended that claims by the 
Indian authorities of reduced usage of informal credit sources following the 
institution of formal facilities in rural areas needed to be treated with some 
reservation. Ghana lacks such data on general household indebtedness to both 
formal and informal credit sources, which makes it impossible to compare 
trends in their changes over time. 
Before introducing our own observations of the application of credit in 
Ghana, however, a general discussion of substitution and complementarity 
between two goods emphasizes the responsiveness of demand for one good to 
price changes in the other, so that if: 
0 
the two goods are competitive, and if 
< 0 
they are complementary. 
In the discussion of formal and informal finance, however, the application 
of price in such a deterministic manner (even if adequate arrangements were 
made to cater for internal inconsistency; see Russell and Wilkinson (1979)), 
loses relevance in view of the highly indeterminate relationship between price 
and demand in this less sophisticated financial market. Thus, for the moment, 
the discussion of substitution and complementarity will need partially to ignore 
the issue of price and operate more with quantities and responses to other 
factors such as availability of credit. This means that substitutability and 
complementarity need to be applied more in terms of the operative sense of the 
words. 
In this regard, if it were assumed that total investments (I) made by any of 
our micro-enterprises would come mainly from personal equity and credit, 
then: 
(1) 
where C is total credit available to the entrepreneur, and ep is personal equity. 
In view of the fact that credit may come from both formal and informal 
sources, (1) becomes 
(2) 1 
if both sources are available to enterprise, where 
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Cf is total formal credit to enterprise, and 
C1 is total informal credit to enterprise. 
In a situation of complementarity between formal and informal credit, it 
would be expected that I would vary directly with both and C,. Similarly C1 
and C, would vary in different directions as I changes in a competitive 








in a competitive situation. 
To test the above, data on the 100 small firms in Eastern Region were 
studied. As already mentioned, these were all enterprises that operated bank 
accounts, that could borrow from the informal sector if they wanted to, and 
had also undertaken some investment expenditure between 1985 and 1989. The 
results show that further analysis to study complementarity and substitution 
between formal and informal credit became unnecessary in view of the fact 
that C1 had turned out to be zero in most cases while was also zero in a 
number of cases over a long period. In other words, both formal and informal 
credit played relatively insignificant roles in the promotion and development 
of micro-enterprises. One can only speculate on what decisions they would 
have made if both facilities had been available to them. Before doing that, 
however, the more general trends in credit application in Ghana are discussed 
here. 
General trends in the demand and supply of credit 
Growth in the banking system's claims on the private sector may be 
considered to be a fair indication of growth in formal credit usage. This may 
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be supplemented by information on the private sector's share of total domestic 
credit in order to obtain a fair view of the use of formal credit in private 
business finance. As Table 1 shows, the claims of the banks on the private 
sector grew substantially in nominal terms between 1978 and 1988 (i.e. by 
4,665 per cent). Average annual nominal growth in those ten years was, 
therefore, 436 per cent (see Table 1). In real terms, however, the claims on the 
private sector declined rapidly until 1983 and then began to rise again until 
1986. 
As nominal lending rates were held fixed for considerable periods of time, 
the real rates fluctuated considerably but remained negative (see Figure 1). 
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 (which shows real bank claims on the 
private sector) does not suggest any logical relationship between formal credit 
usage and lending rates in the period up to 1984 since the banks were 
rationing credit to the private sector. Between 1977 and 1982, the private 
sector's share of total domestic credit fell steadily from 13.6 per cent to 6.4 
per cent. After 1984, however, when real lending rates became relatively more 
stable, lending by the banks also stabilized between 1985 and 1988. 
















1978 12.5 -31.25 739 17.15 43.1 
1979 19.0 -22.93 796 11.95 66.6 
1980 19.0 -20.72 940 9.40 100.0 
1981 19.0 -45.03 134 26.19 216.5 
1982 19.0 -2.70 1558 5.88 264.8 
1983 19.0 -46.61 2838 4.80 590.1 
1984 21.2 -13.26 5978 7.25 824.1 
1985 21.2 -13.26 10,663 11.70 909.1 
1986 23.0 -3.69 18,554 16.38 1,132.4 
1987 28.5 -10.23 23,530 14.85 1,583.6 
1988 26.6 -4.43 33,000 15.86 2,080.0 
Source: IMF, IFS Statistical Yearbook, 1989. 
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Figure 1 
Figure 2 












The period of declining real bank credit to the private sector coincided with 
a period that was characterized by negative attitudes to saving with banks 
attributed to a growing loss of confidence in the formal system (Aryeetey and 
Gockel (1990)). Of 1,000 market women interviewed in three Ghanaian cities, 
the proportion that saved with banks dropped from 49.1 per cent to 36.4 per 
cent. Aside from the growing lack of confidence in the banking system, what 
was considered to be a higher probability of obtaining an informal loan was 
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also often an incentive for joining the susu system. Some caution must be 
exercised, however, in interpreting the described negative attitude to formal 
savings and the decline in formal credit. The decline in formal credit did not 
necessarily mean a growth in informal credit. Even though 65 per cent of the 
1,000 market women could, in principle, borrow from the susu system, only 
10 percent of them had ever financed any expenditures with credit from that 
system. Similarly, of the 100 micro-entrepreneurs who operated in the Eastern 
Region, only six had ever borrowed from proprietary moneylenders to finance 
investments in the period. Indeed, only 19 of them had applied informal credit, 
and in 13 of these cases the lender was either a friend or relative. The fact of 
the matter is that there was not enough informal credit to make up for 
declining formal credit. The picture portrayed above is quite different from 
Bell's observations in India where there was growth in formal credit, 
accompanied by growth in informal credit in many instances. 
It is probably best to look at what happened to rural credit supply when rural 
banks were introduced into Ghanaian rural areas, ostensibly to improve the 
availability of credit to farmers. In 1977, there were only three rural banks in 
Ghana, but this number grew by an average of 10.6 per cent per annum to 
reach 120 by 1988. In the same period, the nominal value of loans and 
overdrafts grew from to In real terms (1980=100), 
however, there was a decline in the yearly amount of credit made available to 
rural farmers/entrepreneurs from çt7.Om in 1977 to in 1988. By 1988 the 
average size of a loan to farmers was (Aryeetey et al. (1990)) and this 
was more that 500 per cent smaller than the average size of agricultural loans 
in 1977 in real terms. According to IPC (1988), the indebtedness of rural 
households was generally low by 1988. The debts of rural households to 
formal institutions represented, on average, 1.6 per cent of their incomes. This 
figure had probably been declining over time, but there is no evidence that 
declining institutional agricultural credit is being replaced by informal credit. 
The above trend may be in spite of the fact that it is estimated that the value 
of informal credit in rural Ghana may be as high as five times that of formal 
credit (IPC (1990)). We believe, however, that this estimate of the magnitude 
of informal credit places great premium on "credit" from friends/relatives. 
Discounting credit from friends/relatives, in view of the fact that its 
non-proprietary nature leaves repayment terms unclear (if any repayment is 
expected at all), the value of informal credit may not be that high. The general 
total demand for credit by small entrepreneurs is believed to be low in view 
of the fact that most of that demand is actually a demand for liquidity. This 
is explained by the fact that the formal indebtedness of most households does 
not exceed their financial savings (IPC (1990)) at a time when most of their 
assets are in illiquid (physical) form. In view of these observations, we suggest 
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that the declining institutional credit is not being replaced by informal credit, 
as can be seen from the number of entrepreneurs who used informal credit. 
Individual borrower choices and opportunities between 
formal and in formal credit 
The third scenario from Bell's (1990) analysis, "equilibrium with non-exclusive 
institutional contracts" comes close to our observed situation. Underlying this 
is the assumption that formal credit is rationed at a given interest rate which 
is lower than informal lenders' rates and, that granted there are no other higher 
costs, borrowers would first seek institutional finance, and that failing spill 
would over into the informal sector. This was observed in India (Bell, 
Srinivasan and Udry (1990)). In our own study, it became apparent that credit 
from informal sources would only be sought after failure to obtain bank credit. 
Fifty-four per cent of the entrepreneurs would first go to the bank, in spite of 
the relatively low probability of their being granted such credit. This is usually 
attributed to the fact that bank credit is much cheaper than credit from 
informal sources (a possible exception being credit from friends/relatives), and 
they do not have to go through any personal harassment in seeking and 
repaying loans, as is often associated with borrowing from moneylenders. 
Indeed, only 5 per cent of the entrepreneurs would contact a moneylender first 
when credit is desired, while 23 per cent would first approach friends. 
Bell's analysis of the choices to be made, and their consequences, in the 
situation where borrowers who have been rationed out of the formal market 
spill over into the informal market, is illustrated in Figure 3, where 
E it = expected profits of moneylender 
E it( = iso-expected-profit contour 
L = size of loan 
r = rate of interest 
Ey = expected net income of borrower 
Ey = iso-expected-income contour of borrower 
= rationed institutional lending 
The borrower's opportunity set is as depicted by the heavy curves in Figure 3. 
The boundary of that opportunity set is made up of 'P (') = 0 and an 
iso-expected-profit contour, which is a member of the lender's map 
drawn with the point (L1,O) as origin to reflect the fact that the 
borrower seeks institutional finance first. The location and shape of that 
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contour will depend on the private lender's knowledge of what dealings 
his client had with the co-operative or bank and the ease of entry into 
lending activities. (Bell (1990) pp. 319) 
Faced with this opportunity set, the borrower seeks to maximize his expected 
net income by choosing the combination of loans that permits him to be "on 
top" of his expected income contour Ey. In Panel 1 of Figure 3, the borrower 
is provided with rationed formallinstitutional credit at a rate of r,, which places 
him at point B on the expected income contour, leaving his demand not 
satisfied. It is assumed here that "the lowest rate the moneylender could charge 
and still make non-negative expected profits, (E it(•) = 0) namely, i, exceeds 
r1". This places the iso-expected-income contour of the borrower Ey () = Ey8 
well below that lowest rate the moneylender can offer, which therefore, does 
not encourage the borrower to spill over into the informal segment of the 
market, even with unsatisfied demand. 
FIgure 3 Competition between an institutional and an informal lender: 
non-exclusive contracts 






Panel 2 introduces two situations where it is assumed that the expected 
income contour EyB is tangential (equilibrium) to the profit contour E it( )=O. 
The two situations depict, first, the outcome when there is free entry to the 
lending business and, second, when the moneylender is a monopolist. Granted 
that the moneylender knows the borrower has been rationed out of the formal 
18 SECTORS OF THE FINANCIAL MARKET IN GHANA 
market, he may make the borrower two possible offers depending on the extent 
of "monopoly" he enjoys in the informal segment of the market. 
First, if there is free entry into moneylending for those willing to invest 
in acquiring inside knowledge about potential clients, then lenders will 
earn zero expected profits and each borrower will face a menu of loan 
contracts described by the contour E it() = 0. In that case the 
borrower will choose point C', where an iso-expected net-income 
contour is tangent to E it(S) = 0. Second, private lenders may have 
sufficient market power to keep would-be borrowers at their reservation 
levels of expected net income, given the opportunities defined by W () 
0. In that case the moneylender will choose point M', where an 
iso-expected-profit contour is tangent to Ey() = EyB. This involves 
making the borrower an all-or-nothing offer of (LM' - L.rM') (Bell 
(1990) pp. 321). 
Panel 2: Spillover 





In the Ghanaian case, all three situations, as depicted in panels 1 and 2, are 
observable. In the first place, there is no guarantee that the rationed-out 
borrower will spill over into the informal segment. Our study suggests the 
following alternatives to institutional credit. For the 80 per cent of the 
0 
0 
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micro-entrepreneurs who did not apply informal credit, the usual reactions to 
the non-availability or inadequacy of formal credit were as follows: 
1. scale down considerably planned investment to equal received formal 
credit, if any; 
2. use personal savings of the entrepreneur or enterprise (when they can be 
separated) to finance part or all of planned investment this is discussed 
further below; 
3. abandon planned investment. 
Spillovers into the informal segment are not a very common way of 
financing micro-enterprises or business activity. There is little demand for 
credit from the proprietary moneylender for investment in economic activity. 
Enterprises that are likely to borrow from proprietary moneylenders for 
investment are either involved in trading in urban areas (with a relatively high 
turnover over a short period) or farming where rather small sums are required 
for a season. In view of the fact that such demand is treated by all concerned 
as an "emergency", and there are not many options available to the borrower, 
of which the moneylender is aware, equilibrium is likely to occur at M'. Such 
traders usually pass on the high cost of funds to their customers. The demand 
for credit facing the moneylender in Ghana has been described as price 
inelastic (IPC (1988)), in view of the fact that such credit is required in 
emergencies, forcing the borrower to take any given interest rate. Most 
moneylenders enjoy a spatial monopoly. 
Complementary relationships in the financial market 
As observed above, a complementary relationship between the facilities of the 
formal and informal segments of the financial market would exist if the growth 
in the demand for one was not at the expense of the other. Thus, for example, 
if growth in investment which relies on formal credit creates additional 
capacity that can be met only with informal credit, the application of the two 
types of credit may be regarded as complementary. 
In other words, based on the "new structuralist" thinking on the role of the 
informal sector, that is, as a provider of residual finance, it is generally 
expected that the joint impact of the two sectors on the economy will depend 
on the volume of residual financing carried out by the informal sector in 
relation to total financing requirements. In this case, residual finance is 
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regarded as additional (informal) finance coming to investors in excess of what 
is available to them from the formal system. This increased demand for credit 
is, therefore, created by the growing use of formal credit in a growing 
economy. 
What the data suggest is that the significance of informal credit as a means 
of residual financing in this manner is very limited. As we noted earlier, only 
one entrepreneur out of 100 interviewed obtained the full amount of credit 
requested from the bank. Of the 26 enterprises that received only a part of the 
requested amount, only one used credit from informal sources (friends and 
relatives) to complete the planned investment expenditure. This trend is 
interesting in view of the fact that credit from informal sources has been 
likened to Lewis' unlimited supply of labour and given a horizontal supply 
curve (Srivastava (1990)). This relationship is based on the suspicion that 
individuals in developing countries are often "forced to hold money in excess 
of desired stock", as exemplified by the so-called "mattress money" holdings. 
Srivastava (1990) suggests that the amount of money individuals hold depends 
on the availability of alternative assets and the costs of acquiring them. It is 
obvious that much importance is attached to credit from "friends and relatives" 
in this context, but from our data, only 14 percent utilized such credit for their 
investments in the enterprises studied. 
That the present situation in Ghana does not conform to one of unlimited 
supply of credit (both formal and informal) may be attributed to the fact that, 
aside from the known institutional constraints to credit expansion in the formal 
system (Aryeetey et al. (1990)), real household incomes, eroded extensively 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, do not appear to have recovered to earlier levels. 
Per capita GNP grew at -1.6 per cent between 1965 and 1987 (World Bank 
(1989)). 
Thus, the use of proprietary informal credit in a complementary role to 
formal credit, as defined above, is not widespread. Evidence from Steel and 
Webster's (1990) study of responses to adjustment policies by micro- 
enterprises suggests that even though the economy is growing, and 
entrepreneurs are investing, micro-entrepreneurs are investing the least, yet it 
is they who would be expected to apply for informal credit. Probably there is 
very little formal credit to carry them to an investment threshold from where 
further use of expensive informal credit can be afforded. 
It is interesting to note the extent to which incomes from other activities of 
the same entrepreneur were used to meet their financing requirements. For a 
significant 18 per cent, the first reaction to a shortage in finance in one 
enterprise would be to resort to finance from their farming activity, or some 
other income-generating activity they undertake, from which income is more 
or less assured. An example of such an activity is trading. The large number 
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of entrepreneurs who indicated that they would use their own savings to invest 
if they failed to obtain formal credit, were actually referring to income from 
other economic activities. This approach to meeting credit requirements brings 
out the importance of interlinked activities in enterprise finance. Of the 
small-scale entrepreneurs studied by Riedel et a!. (1988) in another 
medium-sized town (Techiman), 61.3 per cent were engaged in farming or 
trading in other household goods, and income from these was used in an 
interlinked manner for investment purposes. 
In a welfare sense, the utilization of incomes from one economic activity to 
subsidize another may bring the entrepreneur into a lower net iso-income 
curve. This would be so if the productivity of the subsidized activity is less 
than the other activity, but is being maintained only because the entrepreneur 
would prefer to be known as such instead of as a less prestigious farmer. 
An intermediary role for the informal sector 
Bell (1990) argues that if the moneylender is granted access to low-cost 
institutional credit, this will definitely lower the cost of funds to him, 
irrespective of the market condition. Thus, whether he is a monopolist or 
perfect competitor, it should lead to lower interest rates. For his clients, the 
entire gain from the lower cost of funds will be captured if the moneylender 
is a perfect competitor and marginal costs are constant. The gains will be 
shared if the lender is a monopolist but the borrower has access to information 
not known to the lender, i.e. "an active threat of strategic default by the 
borrower". The monopolist lender keeps the entire gain from a lowering of the 
cost of funds if he can have an exclusive contract. 
From this, it is obvious that greater benefits would be reaped by the 
economy in general if more moneylenders had access to institutional credit. 
But access to institutional credit is generally limited for informal 
moneylenders. Bell (1990) noticed in India that moneylenders who were 
known as such to banks, had less access than others who were not known, but 
actually practised moneylending, e.g. traders. Thus, while in 1952 only 4 per 
cent of village moneylenders in India borrowed from commercial banks, 35 per 
cent of village traders did. Similarly, 25 per cent of urban moneylenders who 
had a number of guises also borrowed from commercial banks, often for 
re-lending. In comparing lending resulting from an intermediary role for 
informal lenders to total credit used by households, however, Bell concluded 
that this was insignificant. 
In Ghana, interviews with 12 moneylenders in Accra, Hohoe and Agona 
Swedru during the first phase of this research, revealed that eight of them 
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saved with commercial banks and had actually borrowed from them before. 
Interestingly, however, "only two of them suggested that credit from banks was 
used to promote their lending business" (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). Indeed, 
it is likely that in periods when institutional credit has been more readily 
available to the private sector in Ghana, moneylenders have taken advantage 
of this facility, but only because they have not revealed information about the 
activity to bank officials. Bank officials quite openly admit that they are not 
interested in promoting the businesses of moneylenders since the process of 
increasing the original interest rate before passing the borrowed sum on to the 
borrower is regarded as exploitative. In other words, the moneylender obtains 
institutional credit only because he is regarded as a rich cocoa farmer, transport 
owner or big trader. 
Most moneylenders operate their lending businesses alongside other 
businesses, and profits are often switched between the two, depending on 
which needs re-capitalization. Quite often also, no separate accounts are kept 
for the two. Thus institutional credit to the moneylender becomes essential 
when all his businesses need re-capitalization. In this situation, only a part of 
the borrowed funds goes to support the lending side of his business. 
Considering that institutional credit to the private sector has not been 
forthcoming over the past decade (Aryeetey et a!. (1990)), it is not likely that 
the inadvertent use of the informal lenders as intermediaries has been a 
common or widespread method of allocating credit in the system. 
The impact of the limited amount of disbursement of credit that has been 
done in this way may also be negligible. The two moneylenders who admitted 
lending borrowed funds said they did not lower their interest rates as a result 
of the lower cost of funds. This was largely in view of the monopolies they 
enjoyed and the price inelasticity of the demand for credit when such credit 
was required to meet an emergency. 
Ill Linkages between formal and informal 
institutions and their significance for 
savings mobilization and financial 
intermediation 
are three possible scenarios for studying the extent of financial 
termediation from savings and borrowing patterns within the informal sector. 
ie first would be a situation of no intermediation, as would be the case 
the rotating savings or ROSCA arrangements. The second would be that 
intermediation occurring with informal units channelling mobilized savings 
formal circuits for possible onward lending, as is the case with operators 
"single-collector-susu" businesses depositing daily mobilized savings with 
nks. The final scenario would be that of intermediation occurring completely 
thin the scope of informal activity, as is presently being attempted by large 
ganizations entering the susu business. 
En view of the fact that we regard the first and last scenarios above as being 
rrently marginal and also inconsequential for the relationship between formal 
d informal institutions, we dwell on the second scenario in this part of the 
idy. As suggested in the introduction, an area of linkage between the formal 
ci informal financial sectors that would be significant for the development 
financial intermediation is the fact that most susu collectors involved in the 
ngle-collector-susu" system use deposit facilities made available by banks 
safe-keeping purposes (Aryeetey and Gockel (1990)). 
fhe implication of such a relationship is that the banking system may 
)vide an avenue for carrying out financial intermediation with informally 
>bilized deposits. In other words, the intermediary role of the banking system 
enhanced through a growth in the volume of deposits (a part of the money 
ck) that originates from informal mobilization efforts. Its impact will depend 
what influence it has on the multiplication process. Thus, in any period, 
inges in the money stock (Ms) would be dependent on changes in the way 
collectors choose to keep the savings deposited with them and what banks 
with these. This is summed by the identity: 
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(3) = mH 
where H is currency (C) plus reserves (R) with the Central Bank 
(4) H = C + R 
and m the multiplier can be expressed as 
1+cx 
(5) m= 
where a is the cash/deposit ratio and is the reserve/deposit ratio (see 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1978)). 
It is generally expected that changes in the money stock should arise from 
the way the monetary base H is directed by the Central Bank and the way the 
multiplier changes from time to time (see Cuthbertson (1985)): 
(6) mMJ = 
H changes in and 
the minimum reserve requirements as well as cash the public wants to hold. 
Thus: 
(7) H = 
(8) m = J(D,rb,CP) 
where D is the total deposits with banks 
rr is the required reserve ratio 
Ci,, is cash held by the public 
rb is actual reserve assets of banks. 
With this, an ideal outcome of our present efforts would have been to show 
that the growth of the money stock in Ghana was dependent on changes in the 
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deposits mobilized informally and to establish the extent to which changes in 
that stock could be attributed to occurrences in the portfolio allocation 
behaviour of susu collectors. This has not been possible in view of the 
inadequacy of data available at banks. Data on bank balances of susu collectors 
in all the banks within a half-kilometre radius of the largest markets in Accra, 
Kumasi and Takoradi were sought. This was because, as suggested earlier, 
most susu collectors "dump" whatever they collect in a day in one of the 
commercial banks near the large markets in all three cities used for the first 
phase of this study. Even though this may not have represented the entire 
deposits of the sector held by the banks, it was expected to have a significant 
impact on the growth in the money stock. 
In view of the above, the identities expressed are not given any behavioural 
content. We only disaggregate them to highlight the significance of informally 
mobilized savings. Thus, if total money stock was taken as total deposits (both 
formally mobilized and informally mobilized) with banks plus currency, then 
the following identity may be used: 
(9) MS = D + C 
where D is total deposits (demand deposits) 
C is currency held by the public. 
If M5 is decomposed in terms of method of mobilization, we obtain: 
(10) = D1-1-D,+C 
where D1 is formally mobilized deposits, and 
D. is informally mobilized deposits. 
Thus: 
(11) MI5 =ftA,4D.4C) 
Use of formal deposit facilities by susu collectors 
Even though the paucity of data does not permit an accurate estimation of the 
significance of informally mobilized savings to the growth of the money stock, 
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data assembled from the collectors themselves, as well as from some banks, 
throw light on the significance of this phenomenon. It will be shown here, 
therefore, that there is a sizeable mobilization effort in relation to total 
mobilization achievements of the banks that originate from susu collectors. 
General information about susu collectors 
The susu collectors studied here all belong to the Greater Accra Susu 
Collectors Association which currently has a little over 500 registered 
members. The information was obtained from questionnaires distributed 
amongst them at one of their regular monthly meetings in Accra. The 
researcher participated in the meeting in order to observe at first hand the 
members' discussions of common problems and their comprehension of official 
attitudes towards them. Thus only those members who attended the monthly 
meeting of November 1990 had the opportunity to fill in the questionnaires. 
This provided us with 151 respondents out of a possible 500. 
Of the 151 respondents only 16 were female. One female collector found 
herself involved in the business out of a conviction that women were better 
placed to provide such a service to other women. (Most of the clients are 
women; see Aryeetey and Gockel (1990).) It is obvious, judging from the 
number of years individual collectors had been in the business, that susu 
collection is still a very active occupation for many people. While 41 per cent 
of the people had been collecting susu for more than three years, the remaining 
59 per cent began their business less than three years previously. Thus susu 
collection is not just another activity for retired teachers or other public 
servants. Indeed, for 72.8 per cent of the respondents, susu collection was their 
only occupation; these were mainly men aged between 25 and 50. For the 
remaining 27 per cent, trading occupied about a third of them, while seven 
collectors were retired public servants. 
Analysis of the savings patterns of susu collectors 
Susu collectors usually have three options when deciding what to do with 
deposits mobilized from market women and others. These are a) deposit them 
with a bank (usually a demand deposit), b) invest in their own business, if 
possible, and c) lend to others. 
The fact that the first option dominates in a situation where hardly any 
returns accrue to the asset, is an indication of the fact that the collectors cannot 
presently attach prime importance to the direct rate of return on the asset itself 
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in view of the short period over which they can hold the deposit. More 
importantly, however, it is also an indication of the "primitive" financial 
structure which is shown by the lack of very short-term financial instruments. 
The collectors usually have to return the daily savings of the market women 
to them after 30 days. 
Following the choice of this short-term asset by the collectors, it is argued 
here that susu collectors perform a significant intermediary role between savers 
and the banking system and other borrowers. The importance of this role lies 
in the several attributes of the role itself. These are: 
1. the sheer magnitude of savings mobilized in this manner and therefore the 
enhanced opportunities for formal intermediation; 
2. the advantages of the savings habit that it helps to develop in the system's 
clients; 
3. the reduction in the mobilization costs of formal banks since they pay 
nothing for the service performed on their behalf by the susu collectors, 
and the reduction in the number of people queuing up at banks to make 
deposits and withdrawals. 
Only one of the 151 susu collector respondents studied did not have a bank 
account at the time. Since it was a regulation of the association that each 
member operated a bank account, this "anomaly" was explained by the fact 
that this collector was new and was in the process of opening an account. One 
hundred of them operate a current account only with the banks, while 31 
operated both a savings account and a current account. Twenty persons 
operated a savings account only. 
Saving with indigenous banks dominates the choice of banks. Thus, 117 out 
of the 151 respondents held accounts with several branches of the Ghana 
Commercial Bank (a state-owned bank) in Accra. In eight of these cases, 
however, the collectors had accounts with another bank notably the Social 
Security Bank, the Co-operative Bank and the National Savings and Credit 
Bank. Only three of the respondents saved with a foreign bank. The collectors 
explained their choice of indigenous banks by "the fact that the large 
well-established foreign banks were not interested in granting any 
concessionary terms in their dealings with them". They see indigenous banks 
as being more sympathetic. Indeed, the Managing Director of a large foreign 
bank insisted he did not know that his bank held deposits for susu collectors. 
In fact, until recently, banks generally adopted the attitude that the susu system 
had nothing to do with formal banking. 
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Susu collectors usually choose banks that are not too far away from the areas 
in which they operate. This is in view of the possible need to make more than 
one visit to the bank in a day. The average distance from the market of 
operation to the banks used by collectors is 3.0 km, and an average of three 
deposits is made in a week. Aside from it being a regulation of their 
association that mobilized savings be kept with banks, the security banks' offer 
was the main reason for using their facilities. 
An average of was collected daily by each of the 151 respondents, 
who make an average daily deposit of Out of the total weekly collection, 
the susu collectors deposit an average of 74 per cent in their bank accounts, 
and 56 per cent of the respondents deposited the entire collection. For those 
who did not deposit the entire collection, the difference was either invested in 
a business by the susu collector himself or lent to very trusted clients. 
The regularity with which susu collectors accumulate certain balances with 
the banks in the course of the month and then run these down at the end of the 
month probably needs to be a focal point in the relationship between banks 
and susu collectors. Data supplied by our respondents show that towards the 
end of one month in 1990 (shortly before the account was emptied for 
payments to clients) susu collectors maintained an average balance of 
By the middle of that month, when they were still mobilizing 
savings, their balances averaged In other words, their individual 
balances rise steadily throughout the month, peaking just before the last day 
of the month, and then drop sharply. These figures from the collectors 
themselves are corroborated by evidence from some of the key bank branches 
they use. Data obtained from one branch of the Ghana Commercial Bank, 
which had the highest number of susu collector-account holders (46), show that 
the average balances of the collectors fell to an average of per susu 
collector on the last day of one month in 1989 after the collectors had made 
significant withdrawals to make payments to their clients. For that branch, the 
total balance of susu collectors by mid-December 1989 was which 
dropped to 12 per cent of that figure at the end of the month. In another 
branch of Ghana Commercial Bank with 31 susu collector-account holders, the 
average balance on the last day of December 1989 was after 
dropping by over 80 per cent from the mid-month figure. In a relatively small 
branch near a large market, deposits from susu collectors formed over 40 per 
cent of total demand deposits in one month. 
Some banks are beginning to see the significance of the susu system in their 
operations. This is shown by the fact that they are now beginning to keep track 
of deposits from susu collectors by identifying such accounts. For such banks, 
a major question is whether it is possible to do much "turning around" of these 
rather short-term deposits in the period during which they hold them. Most 
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bankers insist that this would not be a problem if the economy was rapidly 
growing and short-term finance was being demanded. It is likely that the sharp 
drops in balances on the last day of each month will make conservative 
bankers develop an attitude of indifference towards susu collectors' accounts. 
They are unable to develop the appropriate instruments for dealing with this 
potential source of long-term finance. 
It is not surprising that susu collectors still complain of the banks not 
appreciating their usefulness to the banking system. One major demand that 
collectors make of banks is for the waiving of the payment of ledger fees 
which would help reduce their own costs and improve their profit margins, and 
thereby possibly reduce the service charges paid by clients. Another is the 
allocation of particular bank clerks to handle their deposits and withdrawals at 
the various counters. This should help reduce transaction time considerably and 
allow them more time to carry on with savings mobilization. It was for these 
reasons that the Greater Accra Susu Collectors Association encouraged its 
members to save with the Ghana Commercial Bank. The rationale behind this 
strategy is that the large deposits would add weight to their voice. They hope 
that this bank will soon grant them the required concessions. 
IV Summary and policy implications 
of the study 
This report has attempted to outline and study linkages between formal and 
informal financial sectors in Ghana in the areas of credit allocation and savings 
mobilization. The findings may be summed up as follows. 
(a) Despite the segmentation of the financial market in Ghana, there are 
significant interactions between the formal and informal segments in the 
areas of credit allocation and savings mobilization. 
(b) The linkages in credit allocation may have elements of both competition 
and complementarity, and to a far lesser extent an intermediary role for 
the informal sector between borrowers and the banking system. Indeed, we 
would suggest that a discussion of complementarity and substitution in the 
relationship between the two sectors is currently obscured by the 
non-availability of both types of credit facilities for those who would have 
liked to use them in any manner. Credit from both sectors towards 
financing small enterprises, which dominate national production after 
agriculture, is very limited and is not relied upon by entrepreneurs. For 
policy-making purposes, making credit available in both sectors must 
supersede all other considerations. 
(c) The very limited extent of competition between formal and informal credit 
suppliers, partly born out of the limited ability of both to put credit on the 
market, does not help borrowers to improve their welfare by negotiating 
on the two markets, and therefore denies them access to well-priced 
investable funds. 
(d) On the savings side, a significant amount of private-sector savings held by 
indigenous banks is initially mobilized by the susu collectors of many 
towns. 
(e) Banks take for granted the service performed on their behalf since they 
suffer from excess liquidity and are not looking for avenues to lend. 
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(f) Thus, the linkages between the formal and informal systems currently 
provide no positive benefits for borrowers or savers, and subsequently to 
the economy as a whole, since they do not yet encourage local investment. 
In this situation, the following may be proposed. 
An improved ability of both formal and informal institutions to lend to 
entrepreneurs must be paramount in any government financial sector 
policy reform. For the formal institutions this may come about through: 
(a) an improvement in the general business climate that improves the 
profit-earning capabilities of enterprises; and 
(b) the adoption of better methods for risk assessment, risk management, 
and preparedness to undertake risk. 
For informal lenders, an improved lending ability can only come from 
improved household incomes since this is the main source of lending capital. 
2. In view of the better local information networks that moneylenders 
possess, more open use could be made of them in channelling formal 
credit to light-risk borrowers. For this, moneylenders could be permitted 
to operate as agents of banks, and thereby lend within given interest-rate 
ranges that ensure them adequate profits. Such rates may well be below 
what may be regarded as 'usurious" rates. Through this, banks may reduce 
their risk burdens—since they share this with the moneylender—and improve 
upon the management of credit since the moneylender possesses superior 
knowledge of clients. 
3. Since an improved lending climate is expected to lead banks to raise the 
level of their liabilities to match their growing assets, savings mobilization 
will be boosted. To encourage susu collectors to assist in this process will 
call for some incentives to the collectors. These may include: 
(a) the application of preferential deposit rates (higher than the rates of 
return on their other opportunity sets) that encourage them not only to 
use the facility more, but also to discern recognition of their role in 
savings mobilization by banks; 
(b) the assignment of "special" clerks or tellers to susu collectors at large 
branches patronized by them; 
(c) waiving of all charges and fees on demand deposits of susu collectors 
by banks. 
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These measures would encourage susu collectors to continue using banks, 
instead of investing part of their collections in trading activities, and thereby 
open up the financial system for a more effective role in national 
development 
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